Multi-Engine Checkride Lessons: A Real Pilot’s Experience

Multi-Engine Checkride: Lessons From a Real Twin-Engine Checkride

A Multi-Engine Checkride is one of those practical tests that can change the way a pilot thinks about flying. Learning to operate a twin-engine airplane is not simply a matter of adding another throttle and another engine to skills already developed in a single-engine aircraft. The real challenge begins when the symmetry disappears. Suddenly the pilot has to understand asymmetric thrust, VMC, VYSE, propeller drag, critical-engine effects, single-engine performance, aircraft systems, and the difference between an airplane that is controllable and one that is actually capable of maintaining altitude.

That is also why the Multi-Engine Checkride tends to feel different from many earlier practical tests. The examiner is not interested only in whether the applicant can perform steep turns, stalls, approaches, and landings. Much of the evaluation revolves around whether the pilot understands the twin well enough to make good decisions when one engine is no longer contributing normally. A candidate needs to know the airplane, understand its performance, recognize an engine failure, maintain directional control, identify and verify the affected engine, use the correct aircraft-specific procedures, and continue making sound decisions while workload increases.

One pilot’s account of his own Multi-Engine Checkride captures this particularly well. He was not pursuing an airline career and did not intend to become a professional pilot. Instead, he had returned to aviation after years away and decided to continue challenging himself by adding new ratings. His multi-engine training became another step in rebuilding and maintaining proficiency, and his checkride eventually became a collection of lessons that remain useful to pilots preparing for their own twin-engine practical tests today.

The Multi-Engine Checkride Begins Before the Examiner Arrives

One of the strongest lessons from the original pilot’s story is that preparation started long before the airplane left the ground. The training aircraft was an older Twin Comanche, and rather than relying entirely on worn aircraft documents and basic checklists, the applicant created his own study material. He developed checklists and compact data cards containing items such as power settings and weight-and-balance information, copied relevant pages from the aircraft flight manual, reviewed applicable airworthiness information, and assembled the material into a binder. The process forced him to become intimately familiar with the aircraft rather than merely memorizing answers immediately before the test.

That remains excellent preparation for a modern Multi-Engine Checkride, even though today’s applicants should build their preparation around the current FAA Airman Certification Standards and the approved documents for the specific airplane. Creating your own study notes can expose knowledge gaps surprisingly quickly. If you cannot explain the fuel system without searching through the POH, cannot locate the emergency gear-extension procedure, or cannot determine whether the airplane can meet the day’s expected one-engine-inoperative performance, those weaknesses are much easier to address several days before the checkride than while sitting across from the examiner.

Know the Twin, Not Just Multi-Engine Theory

A multi-engine rating grants privileges for a class of airplanes, but the practical test is conducted in one particular aircraft. That makes aircraft-specific knowledge an essential part of preparation. A candidate who can perfectly explain P-factor and VMC but cannot explain the training aircraft’s fuel system, propeller system, electrical architecture, landing gear, limitations, emergency procedures, or performance data has only prepared for part of the test.

In the pilot’s original checkride, the examiner spent considerable time asking where systems and components were located and discussing emergency gear extension, asymmetric flap problems, electrical failures, fires, and emergency descent procedures. The applicant knew most of the material very well, but during his detailed explanation of emergency gear extension he omitted an important initial action: reducing speed before beginning the procedure. The examiner’s question immediately exposed the omission.

That small moment illustrates an important checkride principle. Knowing every technical detail does not compensate for missing the operational priority that makes the procedure safe. Examiners are often looking for evidence that the applicant can connect knowledge with real aircraft operation rather than simply recite a checklist from memory.

The Oral Portion: Expect Systems, Performance, and Aerodynamics

The oral portion of a Multi-Engine Checkride can cover a wide range of subjects because safe twin-engine operation depends on the interaction of aircraft systems, performance, aerodynamics, and decision-making. Weight and balance, takeoff and landing performance, accelerate-stop considerations where applicable to the aircraft and operation, engine and propeller systems, electrical and fuel systems, landing gear, limitations, emergency procedures, VMC, VYSE, critical-engine concepts, and one-engine-inoperative performance are all natural areas of preparation.

The original applicant was asked about VMC, normal climb speeds, VYSE, and the influence of altitude on minimum-control characteristics. What made the discussion valuable was that the examiner was not simply asking for definitions. He wanted to know whether the applicant understood how the aircraft would behave under different conditions. That is the level of preparation modern candidates should seek as well: not merely “What is VMC?” but “Why does VMC change when the conditions affecting asymmetric thrust and directional-control authority change?”

The FAA’s Airplane Flying Handbook dedicates Chapter 13 to transition into multiengine airplanes and specifically addresses directional control, VMC, VYSE, engine failures, and obtaining the best available performance with an inoperative engine.

VMC: Understand the Concept Behind the Red Line

VMC is one of the defining subjects of multi-engine training, but treating it merely as a red radial line on the airspeed indicator misses the point. The important question is what happens to directional control when asymmetric yaw becomes stronger than the aerodynamic control authority available to oppose it. High power on the operating engine can create a substantial yawing moment, while decreasing airspeed reduces aerodynamic control effectiveness. Aircraft configuration, propeller condition, CG position, bank angle, altitude, and other factors can influence the relationship.

A well-prepared applicant should therefore be capable of discussing not only the published VMC but also the aerodynamic reasoning behind the factors that affect minimum control. The Multi-Engine Checkride is designed to evaluate practical aeronautical understanding, so a candidate who understands the forces involved is in a much stronger position than someone who has simply memorized a list of VMC factors.

The FAA’s Airplane Flying Handbook, Chapter 13 is an excellent authoritative reference for this preparation. FAA guidance emphasizes both directional control and best performance with an inoperative engine and relates those concepts to the familiar red VMC and blue VYSE markings found in many light twins.

VYSE: The Blue Line Is About Performance

If VMC represents a major directional-control consideration, VYSE represents another central part of twin-engine thinking: obtaining the best available climb performance with one engine inoperative under the conditions for which the speed is defined. Students often learn to recognize VYSE as the “blue line,” but the checkride requires a more useful understanding of why protecting appropriate airspeed matters after an engine failure.

A light twin may remain controllable after losing an engine while having very little excess power available for climbing. If the pilot responds to poor climb performance by continually raising the nose, airspeed can deteriorate without producing the desired climb. The airplane may eventually move toward a condition with less directional-control margin at exactly the moment when asymmetric thrust remains significant. A good multi-engine pilot therefore understands that maintaining a safe and appropriate airspeed can be more important than desperately attempting to maintain altitude.

Controllability and Performance Are Not the Same Thing

One of the most important ideas to understand before a Multi-Engine Checkride is that an airplane’s ability to remain under control on one engine does not guarantee that it can climb—or even maintain altitude—on that engine. Losing one of two engines does not simply mean losing half of the airplane’s performance because climb depends on excess power rather than total power alone. Once the power required for level flight is considered, the loss of one engine can remove a very large proportion of the power that was available for climbing.

Weight, density altitude, temperature, aircraft configuration, propeller drag, and the actual performance of the operating engine can all influence the result. This distinction becomes especially important during takeoff planning because the existence of a second engine should never be interpreted as an automatic guarantee that the aircraft can continue climbing after an engine failure. The candidate should know how to use the aircraft’s approved performance information to determine what can realistically be expected under the conditions of the checkride.

Preflight Is Part of the Evaluation

The practical test does not suddenly begin when the wheels leave the runway. During the original pilot’s checkride, the examiner observed the preflight and asked why particular items were being checked and what the applicant was looking for. Because the pilot habitually used the checklist during the Twin Comanche preflight, he could explain the purpose behind his actions rather than simply moving mechanically around the airplane.

That is an excellent standard for any modern candidate. During a twin-engine preflight, the applicant should be prepared to discuss items such as propeller condition, engine oil, fuel quantity and quality, landing gear components, control surfaces, static and pitot sources, vents, antennas, and aircraft-specific items identified by the manufacturer. The examiner may not ask about every component, but the applicant should understand what is being inspected, what an abnormal indication might mean, and whether the discrepancy would affect airworthiness or the decision to fly.

Every Twin-Engine Takeoff Deserves a Plan

The original pilot’s account contains a revealing conversation during taxi. Knowing that the runway was exceptionally long, he asked the examiner which taxiway should be used while considering what would happen if an engine were lost during takeoff. His reasoning was simple: every takeoff should include some consideration of what the pilot will do if an engine fails.

That mindset matters more than memorizing a generic briefing. Before takeoff, the pilot should understand the runway available, aircraft weight, density altitude, obstacles, expected one-engine performance, and the actions appropriate at different phases of the takeoff. A problem early in the ground roll with adequate runway remaining may call for a straightforward reject, while an engine failure after liftoff creates a very different decision problem. Aircraft-specific procedures and performance information should determine the response.

Engine-Out Work Is the Heart of Multi-Engine Training

The original pilot summarized his multi-engine training in a deliberately simple way: much of learning to fly a twin involved learning to manage it with one engine unavailable in different configurations and situations. Although a modern practical test encompasses much more than engine failures, that observation captures why asymmetric operations occupy such an important place in multi-engine training.

When one engine loses power, the pilot has several problems to manage simultaneously. Asymmetric thrust produces yaw, the inoperative side may create significant drag, climb performance deteriorates, aircraft configuration becomes more important, and workload rises sharply. The pilot must continue flying while determining what has happened. That is why engine-out procedures are not simply checklist exercises; they test aircraft control, systems knowledge, aerodynamic understanding, situational awareness, and judgment at the same time.

Identify, Verify, and Secure

During training, the pilot in the original account had developed a clear sequence for simulated failures: identify the affected engine, verify it by appropriately checking the suspected engine, and then proceed with the securing procedure when required. During the checkride, however, a small communication mismatch developed because the applicant and examiner had different expectations about whether the engine would merely be simulated at zero thrust or actually feathered. They discussed the misunderstanding and established a clear plan for the next exercise.

There are two valuable lessons here. First, identification is not verification. Mnemonics such as “dead foot, dead engine” can help identify the suspected engine, but an applicant should use the aircraft-specific procedure to verify it before taking an irreversible action. Second, the applicant and examiner should clearly understand how simulated failures will be conducted. Checkrides already create substantial workload; ambiguity about who controls a throttle or whether an engine is being simulated versus actually secured adds unnecessary confusion.

Feathering and Propeller Drag

Feathering is one of the concepts that makes multi-engine engine-out training fundamentally different from ordinary single-engine emergency practice. When a failed engine’s propeller continues windmilling, the airflow drives the propeller and the resulting aerodynamic drag can seriously degrade aircraft performance. Moving the blades toward the feathered position reduces this drag and can significantly improve the airplane’s one-engine-inoperative performance.

A candidate should understand the specific propeller system installed on the checkride aircraft rather than relying on generic knowledge. That includes how feathering occurs, any mechanisms designed to prevent inadvertent feathering at low RPM, the procedure for unfeathering or restarting where applicable, and the limitations associated with intentionally shutting down an engine during training. The examiner may be interested not only in whether the candidate knows which lever to move, but also in whether the candidate understands what is physically happening to the propeller.

When the Engine Does Not Restart as Expected

One of the most memorable parts of the original checkride occurred after the examiner asked the applicant to completely shut down and feather an engine. During training, restarting had apparently been routine, but on the checkride the engine initially refused to cooperate. Instead of allowing the restart problem to consume all of his attention, the applicant continued controlling the airplane, recognized that repeated starter use was not producing the desired result, allowed time for the starter to cool, reconsidered the mixture technique, and eventually obtained a successful restart.

The larger lesson is more important than the exact starting technique used in that particular older Twin Comanche. Unexpected events during a checkride should be managed using the approved aircraft procedures and sound judgment, not improvised from a story about another airplane. What is worth carrying forward is the pilot’s workload management: a malfunction or abnormal response should not cause the applicant to stop flying the aircraft. Heading, altitude, airspeed, terrain, traffic, and overall situational awareness continue to matter while troubleshooting is underway.

A Checkride Is Also a Test of Workload Management

The examiner later told the applicant that he had been watching how well altitude and heading were maintained during the restart distraction. That is an important clue about what practical testing is really evaluating. A maneuver may begin as an engine-out exercise, but an examiner can also observe whether the pilot becomes fixated, whether basic aircraft control deteriorates, whether the checklist is used appropriately, and whether the candidate continues thinking while the original plan changes.

The same principle applies throughout the Multi-Engine Checkride. A candidate who encounters an unexpected problem does not necessarily need to produce a perfect response instantly. What matters is whether the pilot remains in command of the situation, prioritizes correctly, uses available resources, and avoids allowing one problem to create several new ones.

Instrument Tasks Can Add Another Layer

For an applicant combining applicable multi-engine and instrument privileges, instrument tasks can introduce another layer of workload. The original pilot had carefully prepared for two expected approaches, with charts ready and radios configured, only to have the examiner suddenly create a scenario requiring a diversion to another airport. Instead of flying the approaches he had mentally rehearsed, he had to reconfigure the navigation setup, select an appropriate approach, manage the airplane, and continue under simulated instrument conditions.

This illustrates why checkride preparation should not become overly scripted. Knowing exactly how to fly one familiar approach at the home airport is not the same as demonstrating instrument competence. An examiner may introduce changes precisely because real flying rarely follows a perfectly rehearsed sequence. The applicant should be able to retrieve information, re-plan, configure navigation equipment, brief an unfamiliar procedure, and continue maintaining control without allowing the increased workload to overwhelm basic flying.

One Engine Inoperative Near the Airport

Later in the original checkride, the applicant was circling to land when the examiner simulated failure of the right engine. Because the airplane was already positioned to land, the pilot stabilized the aircraft, completed the applicable simulated engine-out actions, assessed the situation, and asked whether the examiner wanted the landing continued. The examiner’s response reflected a practical operational philosophy: if the airplane genuinely had only one operating engine and was already safely positioned to land, unnecessarily abandoning that opportunity would deserve serious consideration. The applicant continued and landed.

That does not create a universal rule that every engine-out situation should automatically result in an immediate landing regardless of conditions. Instead, it illustrates the kind of judgment an examiner may be looking for. Once redundancy has been reduced, the pilot should consider what additional risk is created by continuing flight, whether a suitable runway is already available, what the airplane’s performance looks like, and whether another maneuver genuinely improves the situation.

For a more detailed look at the landing itself, including directional control, configuration, airspeed, drag, and the limitations of an engine-out go-around, continue later with Twin Engine One Engine Landing.

The Examiner May Change the Plan

Another valuable lesson from the checkride story is that the applicant repeatedly had to adapt. The expected instrument approaches changed, traffic complicated the procedure, an engine restart did not initially go as planned, and an engine failure was introduced while close to the airport. None of these situations could be handled simply by memorizing the exact order of the practical test.

That unpredictability is useful. Real-world flying rarely presents emergencies in the same order used during training, and an examiner needs to determine whether the candidate can apply knowledge rather than merely repeat a rehearsed sequence. The best preparation is therefore not to predict exactly what the examiner will do. It is to understand the airplane and procedures well enough that changes in sequence do not destroy the applicant’s situational awareness.

Decision-Making Matters as Much as Precision

During the final instrument portion of the original ride, traffic and positioning created a less-than-ideal approach setup. The applicant remained aware of where the aircraft was and ultimately completed the approach, but during the postflight discussion the examiner asked what he would have done if the same situation had occurred in actual instrument conditions. The pilot answered that he would have gone missed and flown the approach again rather than continue when he was not satisfied with the situation. The examiner agreed with the reasoning but noted that he would have preferred to hear the applicant make that decision during the maneuver itself.

That is an excellent lesson for any checkride. Examiners cannot evaluate a decision that remains entirely inside the applicant’s head. If a candidate recognizes that a maneuver or approach has deteriorated to the point where discontinuing it is appropriate, saying so clearly demonstrates judgment. Continuing merely because “this is the checkride” can produce the opposite impression. A go-around, rejected takeoff, discontinued maneuver, or missed approach can be evidence of good decision-making when circumstances justify it.

Use the Checklist Without Becoming Dependent on It

Checklists played an important role throughout the original pilot’s preparation and practical test. He used them carefully during preflight, used them to verify engine-secure procedures, and had invested time before the ride in creating useful reference material. At the same time, the checkride demonstrated that possessing a checklist is not a substitute for understanding priorities. The airplane still has to be controlled while the checklist is being retrieved and used.

This distinction is particularly important during engine-out operations. Immediate aircraft control and aircraft-specific memory items, where applicable, may precede verification with a written checklist. Once workload permits, the checklist becomes an important tool for confirming that required actions have been completed. The candidate should know which actions require immediate recall, which require verification, and when looking inside the cockpit would create more risk than benefit.

Know the Current ACS for Your Checkride

The original story predates today’s Airman Certification Standards, so candidates should not use its sequence as a current description of exactly what an FAA examiner must test. The FAA currently lists Private Pilot for Airplane Category ACS (FAA-S-ACS-6C) and Commercial Pilot for Airplane Category ACS (FAA-S-ACS-7B), both published in April 2024 and effective May 31, 2024. Which standards and additional-rating task tables apply depends on the certificate and rating being sought.

Before training reaches the final checkride-preparation stage, applicants should therefore review the current FAA Airman Certification Standards rather than relying on old checkride write-ups, outdated PTS material, or another pilot’s memory of a practical test. A personal checkride story can show what the experience feels like and reveal valuable lessons, but the current ACS defines the modern testing framework.

How to Prepare for the Multi-Engine Checkride

Effective Multi-Engine Checkride preparation should combine aircraft-specific knowledge with practical understanding rather than attempting to memorize hundreds of disconnected answers. Start with the current ACS and identify the tasks applicable to your certification path. Then use the aircraft’s POH or AFM to build your understanding of limitations, systems, performance, weight and balance, normal procedures, emergency procedures, and engine-out characteristics. Review the FAA multiengine guidance and make sure you can explain the aerodynamic reasoning behind VMC, VYSE, asymmetric thrust, critical-engine effects, zero sideslip, and propeller drag.

Just as importantly, practice explaining those subjects aloud. If an instructor asks why a windmilling propeller is harmful to engine-out performance, answer the question rather than reciting the feathering checklist. If asked whether the airplane can climb after losing an engine on today’s takeoff, use the performance information and conditions rather than answering from intuition. If asked what makes one engine critical, explain the actual aerodynamic effects. Oral preparation becomes much easier when the candidate understands the system rather than memorizing the expected question.

Common Multi-Engine Checkride Mistakes

Many checkride problems are not caused by a complete lack of knowledge. They result from losing priorities when workload rises. A pilot may know the engine-failure procedure but allow airspeed to deteriorate while troubleshooting. Another may correctly identify the failed engine but rush the verification step. A candidate may understand VMC theoretically yet fail to recognize a deteriorating directional-control situation during the demonstration. Someone else may become so focused on maintaining altitude that the airplane is allowed to slow when accepting a controlled descent would be safer.

Other mistakes are much simpler: incomplete passenger or examiner briefing, weak checklist discipline, failure to know aircraft limitations, poor preflight planning, incomplete systems knowledge, or continuing an unstable maneuver because the applicant is afraid that discontinuing it will look bad. The original checkride story contains several small imperfections, yet the pilot still demonstrated that he understood the airplane, remained in control, adapted to unexpected situations, and could explain the reasoning behind his decisions. That is a useful reminder that a checkride is an evaluation of overall competence—not a contest to appear mechanically perfect every second.

Proficiency Matters After the Checkride Too

One of the most personal lessons in the original account appears before the actual checkride story begins. After spending years away from active flying, the pilot became convinced that staying current and genuinely proficient required deliberate effort. He made regular flying and continued training a priority rather than treating the new rating as an endpoint.

That lesson is particularly relevant to multi-engine flying. A pilot can successfully complete a Multi-Engine Checkride and still lose proficiency if engine-out procedures, aircraft systems, performance planning, and asymmetric-flight skills are rarely practiced afterward. Legal currency and genuine proficiency are not necessarily the same thing. Twin-engine flying rewards pilots who continue training, review aircraft-specific procedures, and periodically practice abnormal scenarios with a qualified instructor rather than waiting until those skills are needed unexpectedly.

The Checkride Is Not About Tricking the Applicant

The pilot who wrote the original account finished by describing the experience positively. Although he had been nervous about flying with an unfamiliar examiner, he felt that the examiner was interested in evaluating his competence rather than simply searching for an excuse to fail him. The examiner questioned decisions, introduced distractions, changed plans, and pointed out areas that could have been handled differently, but the experience also became an opportunity for learning.

That is a useful mindset when approaching a practical test. The goal should not be to guess every trick an examiner might use. A better objective is to arrive knowing the aircraft, understanding the applicable standards, having realistic performance expectations, and being prepared to make conservative decisions when circumstances change. A pilot who genuinely understands the twin has far less to fear from an unexpected question than one who has memorized a scripted checkride.

Conclusion

A Multi-Engine Checkride is ultimately an evaluation of whether a pilot can combine knowledge, aircraft control, systems understanding, performance planning, and judgment while operating a twin-engine airplane. The oral examination establishes whether the applicant understands the aircraft and the aerodynamics behind asymmetric flight, while the flight portion demonstrates whether that knowledge remains usable when workload increases and the airplane no longer behaves symmetrically.

The most important lessons extend beyond any individual maneuver. Maintain aircraft control before troubleshooting, protect appropriate airspeed, understand VMC rather than simply memorizing the red line, know what VYSE represents, identify and verify before securing an engine, use aircraft-specific procedures, understand actual one-engine performance, and be willing to discontinue a maneuver or approach when continuing no longer makes sense. Those principles are more valuable than trying to reproduce another pilot’s checkride exactly.

And when an engine-out scenario ends with the aircraft approaching a runway, another set of decisions begins. Continue with Twin Engine One Engine Landing for a detailed look at airspeed management, directional control, configuration, drag, approach planning, landing technique, and the difficult question of whether an engine-out go-around is actually available.